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Optimal compensation contracts under asymmetric
information concerning expected earnings
Abstract. We analyze a model with two-dimensional asymmetric infor-
mation where the employer has better information about the rms earnings
potential and the employee is subject to moral hazard. The employees con-
tract consists of an annual bonus and stock options. We focus on two issues:
how di¤erent degrees of asymmetric information about short-term earnings
versus long-term earnings a¤ect optimal contracts and second, if a signalling
equilibrium exists, what information concerning the rms performance pro-
le over time can be conveyed by the choice of contract. We show that if
the extent of long-term (short-term) asymmetric information is larger, short-
term (long-term) compensation prevails. With regard to signalling, we show
that rms o¤ering more options have higher short-term performance and
lower long-term performance. This provides new insights into the structure
of earnings-based compensation. For example, this is consistent with evi-
dence that stock options are inversely related to the timeliness of accounting
numbers or to the extent to which current earnings incorporate value-relevant
information and that rms issuing stock options for employees outperform
other rms shortly after the issue while there is no signicant di¤erence in
the long run.
JEL classication: D82, J33, M12, M52
Keywords: Optimal compensation, Asymmetric information, Annual bonus,
Stock options
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1 Introduction
The structure of compensation contracts is an important issue in accounting
and corporate governance literature. This paper is based on the existence
of asymmetric information between an employer and a worker. The liter-
ature dealing with asymmetric information related to the employer-worker
relationship usually assumes that private information is held by potential
workers (such as their ability level, for instance). In the present paper, an
employer has private information about a rms earnings potential. Existing
literature on implicit contracts (pioneered by Azariadis, 1983) studies similar
situations. This literature analyzes the level of unemployment, the problem
of wage rigidity and other macroeconomic questions. It also typically consid-
ers one-dimensional asymmetric information: there are good and bad types
of rms and the extent of asymmetry does not vary over time. Considera-
tions such as risk-sharing, the trade-o¤ between work and leisure, and the
technology of production play an important role in these models. However,
the structure of compensation contracts is not usually the focus. This paper
focuses on earnings-based compensation which has been used in an increas-
ing number of contracts in recent years. Our analysis includes its two most
important components: annual bonuses and stock options.
Hayes and Schaefer (2005) focus on a bonus-xed wage structure in a
situation where insiders have ex-post private information from observing the
outcome of their employees e¤ort before the stock markets participants.
An employees bonus thus relies on relational contracts (Baker, Gibbons and
Murphy, 1994) and non-verifyable information.1 We analyze a signaling game
where employers have ex-ante private information vis-a-vis the potential em-
ployees and the market participants and this information is two-dimensional:
the employers have private information about the amounts and timing of
future expected earnings.2 As in implicit contract literature, rms may have
private information about their productivity which leads to asymmetric infor-
1The authors analyze how the value of a rms reputation and the weights of short-term
share price and long-term share price in the rms objective function a¤ect the optimal
bonus payment. In particular, it is shown that if the value of a rms reputation is not
su¢ ciently large then greater concern for short-term share price means succesful rms
can credibly commit to pay larger bonuses to avoid mimicking by unsuccesful rms. This
explains why the insidersmyopia and short-termism may lead to higher prots.
2Lambert (2001) noticed that a set-up where the principal (employer) has private infor-
mation about strategic variables is interesting for analyzing compensation related issues.
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mation about expected earnings. Asymmetric information about the timing
of earnings may take place because: 1) corporations typically employ long-
term strategic planning, giving the employer private information for several
years and; 2) the employer may have private information about allowance for
bad debts, recognition of sales not yet shipped, estimation of pension liabil-
ities, capitalization of leases and marketing expenses, delay in maintenance
expenditures and delay in production etc.3
We argue that an employers private information about a rms perfor-
mance prole over time signicantly a¤ects the optimal structure of earnings-
based compensation contracts which remain puzzling from a "pure" moral
hazard or agency theory viewpont (see, among others, Core, Guay and
Verechia (2003), Murphy (1999), Lambert (2001) and Yermack (1995, 1997)).
We focus on the following questions: what information about a rms earn-
ings potential can be conveyed by the choice of employees compensation
contracts, in particular why the use of stock options may be negatively cor-
related with a rms future performance (contrary to the usual moral hazard
predictions); how di¤erent degrees of asymmetric information about short-
term earnings versus long-term earnings a¤ect the optimal contract; and why
short-term earnings-based compensation may prevail over long-term compen-
sation.
More specically, we consider a two-period situation where, in each pe-
riod, a rm must hire a worker. This is done by o¤ering a compensation
contract contingent on rst-period earnings (such as an annual bonus, for in-
stance) or second-period earnings (stocks or options). Workers may accept or
reject the contract according to their beliefs about the rms earnings prole
over time which they try to ascertain from the o¤ered contract. After ac-
cepting the contract, the worker chooses the level of e¤ort they will provide.
In this game the degree of asymmetric information regarding short-term and
long-term earnings may vary. Asymmetry regarding long-term earnings is
high when information about short-term prospects is publicly available while
long-term performance is unknown. This may be the case when short-term
performance relies on past decisions which are publicly observable while long-
term performance may depend on strategic decisions which are not disclosed.
Long-term asymmetry may also be high when there is asymmetric informa-
tion regarding the entrepreneurial skills of top-management. Asymmetric
3Miglo (in press) and Miglo and Zenkevich (2006) analyze the e¤ect of private infor-
mation concerning the timing of earnings on capital structure.
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information regarding short-term earnings is high when the rm has impor-
tant private short-term information like delays in production while there is
little asymmetry regarding long-term information. This can also be the case
when the quality of accounting technology is low or when monitoring is very
expensive.
We show that if the extent of long-term asymmetric information is larger,
short-term compensation prevails. If short-term private information is more
important, long-term compensation prevails. This is consistent with evi-
dence provided by Bushman, Chen, Engel and Smith (2004). The authors
show that stock options are inversely related to the timeliness of accounting
numbers or to the extent to which current earnings incorporate value-relevant
information. If the asymmetry regarding current earnings is high, the rela-
tionship between current earnings and rm value is low. It is also consistent
with evidence that a higher proportion of management ownership is observed
in rms where more monitoring is required (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), and
that management ownership across countries varies inversely with the quality
of a countrys accounting disclosure policies (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and
Vishny, 1998).
With regard to signalling, we show that a separating equilibrium exists
if asymmetric information regarding the timing of cash ows is larger than
that regarding total cash ows. To provide basic ideas about the separating
equilibria and how private information about a rms prot prole over time
can a¤ect contract choice let us suppose that there are only two types of rms.
One is performance-improvingand has an increasing expected prot, while
others are stagnant and have a atter or decreasing expected prot. In
such an environment, equilibrium contracts can be a¤ected by the lemon
e¤ect in both the short run and long run.4 Intuitively, the performance-
improving type appears to have an informational advantage in the short run:
lower prots in this period mean that this type of rm can capitalize on
the adverse selection problem. In the long run the informational advantage
passes to the stagnating type. A separating equilibrium exists if the types
have no incentive to mimic each other. If the performance-improving type
wants to separate itself in equilibrium it will o¤er a contract which puts high
weight on the rst period such as an annual bonus (as opposed to stock
options).
4We use the phrase "lemon" problem to describe a situation where private information
leads to the underpricing of the "good" type (Akerlo¤, 1970).
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The basic model is described
in Section 2. Sections 3 and 4 analyze the optimal design of compensation
contracts under asymmetric information. The model implications and em-
pirical evidence are discussed in Section 4. The conclusion is presented in
Section 5.
2 Model.
Consider a rm with a two-stage production process. In each stage t = 1; 2,
earnings ert depend on a workers e¤ort and the rms productivity. For
simplicity assume that there are two levels of e¤ort et. If et = 0 then ert = 0.
If et = 1, production can either be successful or unsuccessful. If the former
is the case, ert = 1 and if the latter is the case, ert = 0. There are two types
of rms. For type g ("good") the probability of success in the rst period
equals g1 and that in the second period equals g2. Type b ("bad") has
parameters b1 and b2. By denition, g has better overall performance than
b: vg > vb, where vx = x1 + x2 is rm xs total expected earnings over the
two periods. Let 0 be the proportion of type g rms, 0 < 0 < 1. Letbt = gt0 + bt(1  0) ("average rmsperformance in period t"). In each
period, et = 1 costs theWorker c. We assume that the s are restricted to the
interval (c; 1], which implies that et = 1 is socially optimal and production
is protable in each period. Stages are technologically dependant. If e1 = 0
then, regardless the e¤ort in the second period, r2 = 0.
At the beginning of each period the Employer (the rms owner or the
Directors Board) o¤ers a contract to the Worker. The Worker may accept or
reject the o¤er. If the o¤er is rejected then the payo¤ to both parties equals
0. If the o¤er is accepted then the Worker chooses e1. The same scenario
repeats in the second period after the parties observe r1. The Workers
payo¤ is a fraction of the rms prot. The rst-period contract contains
two numbers: an annual bonus representing a fraction (f1) of rst-period
earnings and a portfolio of stock options which give the Worker the right
to purchase a fraction (f) of the rms shares (it is assumed for simplicity
that the exercise price equals 0) at the end of the rst period.5 Selling
5The assumption concerning zero exercise prices is not crucial. Also, the introduction
of more kinds of compensation such as restricted stocks, long-term incentive plans or
retirement plans in the contract will not alter the results. Both these remarks hold true as
long as long-term compensation depends more on the rms second-period earnings than
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options at the beginning of the rst period is prohibited. Companies often
put restrictions of this nature on the sale of options at the beginning of
a workers employment. Typically, options are not directly tradeable and
secondly they become exercisable (i.e. the recipient is given the right to buy
stocks) over time (Murphy, 1999). The second-period contract contains only
the annual bonus of the Worker which is represented by a fraction of the
second-period prot (f2). We assume limited liability for both parties:
0  ft  1 and 0  f  1 (1)
f2 + f  1 (2)
If f1 < f the equity-based component (long-term incentive) prevails in the
rst-period contract and vice versa. Let t denote the proportion of earnings
retained by the Employer in period t. Clearly,
1 = 1  f1 and 2 = 1  f2   f (3)
There exists universal risk-neutrality in this economy. For simplicity it
is assumed that the Workers reservation payo¤ in each period equals 0.
The second-period incentive constraint for the Worker is that his expected
second-period payo¤ is not smaller than c. We also assume the existence of
a perfect capital market for shares. At the end of rst period the Worker
can sell a portion of their shares. We denote the remaining fraction of shares
by fn. In the rst period, the Workers incentive constraint (assuming that
the second-period incentive constraint holds) is that his expected net payo¤
from supplying e1 = 1 (which includes the rst-period bonus, the value of
shares sold at the end of the rst period, and the second-period payo¤minus
c) is not less than c.6 The Employer knows the rms type, but the Worker
does not. The distribution of types is common knowledge. The contracts are
enforceable at no cost.
The sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 1. We assume that the
rms type is revealed to the Employer in period 0. Throughout this arti-
cle, we use the concept of Perfect-Bayesian equilibria and also verify that
on rst-period earnings. This is even the case for restricted stocks because they usually
have di¤erent timing constraints (Murphy, 1999).
6The Worker is ready to exchange the cost of e¤ort for consumption in either the rst or
second period. This can be interpreted as a perfect credit market with a risk-free interest
rate equal to 0. This allows workers to transfer funds between periods.
7
o¤-equilibrium beliefs survive standard renements such as Cho and Kreps
(1987) intuitive criterion and mispricing. The usage of these criteria in a
game without repetition where the informed party moves rst is quite com-
mon in existing literature.7
-t = 0 t = 1 t = 2s s s
Firms type
is realized
It is revealed to
the Employer
Employer o¤ers f1 and f
to the Worker
If the o¤er is rejected
both parties get 0
Otherwise the Worker
chooses e1
Project yields r1
It is distributed to
the parties
The Worker decides how
many shares to sell
Employer o¤ers f2
to the Worker
If the o¤er is rejected
both parties get 0
Otherwise the Worker
chooses e1
Project yields r2
It is distributed
to the parties
Figure 1. The sequence of events.
2.1 Symmetric information.
This subsection provides some useful information about benchmark contracts
when the Worker knows the rms type. The relations describing the parties
decisions and payo¤s are:
1) the second-period incentive constraint for the Worker:
c  (fn + f2)2 (4)
If it holds then e2 = 1. Otherwise e2 = 0.
2) the choice of f2 by the Employer:
f2 = argmaxE[(1  f2   fn)r2] (5)
7See, for instance, Diamond (1991, 1993), Myers and Majluf (1984) or Nachman and
Noe (1994).
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3) the rms market value at the end of the rst period equals V1 = 2 if
the capital market believes that the Worker will supply e2 = 1 (i.e. condition
(4) holds) and zero otherwise.
4) the Workers decision to sell shares:
fn = argmax[(f   fn)V1 +maxf0; (fn + f2)2   cg] (6)
where (f   fn)V1 represents the value of shares sold by the Worker and
maxf0; (fn + f2)2   cg is the Workers expected second-period payo¤.
5) the rst-period incentive constraint for the Worker:
c  f11 + (f   fn)V1 +maxf0; (fn + f2)2   cg (7)
6) the Employers payo¤ is
 = 1r1 + 2r2
Given (3) we can write
 = (1  f1)r1 + (1  f2   f)r2 (8)
The Employers problem is to maximize the expected value of (8):
f1; f = argmaxE[(1  f1)r1 + (1  f2   f)r2] (9)
Proposition 1. When information is symmetric:
f2 = c=2 (10)
c = f11 + f2 (11)
V0 = E = 1 + 2   2c (12)
(all mathematical proofs are collected in the Appendix).
From (10), the fraction of second-period earnings o¤ered to the Worker,
is positively related to the cost of e¤ort and negatively related to the rms
expected performance in that period. The logic behind (11) is similar. Eq.
(12) implies that in the case of perfect information, the value of the rm (for
the Employer) does not depend on the structure of the compensation contract
(short-term versus long-term) o¤ered to the Worker as long as conditions (10)
and (11) hold. For instance one can have a contract with a very small f1 as
well as a contract with a very small f .
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3 Signalling by the choice of compensation
contract.
Now suppose that the rms type is the Employers private information. We
start with an e¢ cient separating equilibrium where each type of Employer
gets the rst-best return (12). From (10) and (11) the strategy of the Em-
ployer can be completely described by only one variable. Take f1 for conve-
nience. Let V f1km be the expected payo¤ to the Employer of type k if strategy
f1 is played and the type is perceived by the Worker as typem; k;m 2 fg; bg.
A separating equilibrium is a situation where type g plays strategy f1g, type
b plays strategy f1b and neither type has an incentive to mimic the other.
V f1bgb  V f1ggg (13)
V
f1g
bg  V f1bbb (14)
Given limited liability and that if the contract is rejected, the payo¤ to
the rm equals 0, only accepted contracts are a part of equilibrium. There-
fore, the value of V f1km depends on the performance of type k and the issued
contracts which in turn depend on the Workers beliefs about the rms type
(type m).
V f1km = (1  f1m)k1 + (1  f2m   fm)k2 (15)
where from (10) and (11):
fm =
c  f1mm1
m2
(16)
f2m = c=m2 (17)
We also know from Proposition 1 that V f1xxx = vx   2c; x 2 b; g.
Lemma 1. If gt  bt; t = 1; 2 an e¢ cient separating equilibrium does
not exist.
Intuitively, if the good type (g) has better performance in both periods
then any contract issued by this type has a higher value than that issued
by type b. Therefore the latter always mimics type g. Thus, a necessary
condition for the existence of an e¢ cient separating equilibrium is one of the
following. Either g1 > b1 and g2 < b2 or g2 > b2 and g1 < b1. We will
now continue with these two cases. The values of di¤erent contracts depend
in di¤erent ways on the rms expected performance in each period. Since
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each type performs di¤erently in each period the value of contracts o¤ered by
di¤erent types are di¤erent. To avoid mimicking, type g will o¤er contracts
which put more weight on the earnings in the period when it underperformes
type b. Thus, in the rst case, we expect that type g will o¤er a contract with
a large number of stock options while in the second case it will o¤er a large
bonus. In a separating equilibrium, type b will o¤er the opposite contracts.
The analysis of conditions (13) and (14) leads to the following result.
Proposition 2. If g1 > b1 and g2 < b2 then a separating equilibrium
exists if and only if
g1b2   b1g2
g1   b1  2c (18)
Furthermore if a separating equilibrium exists then
f1b  f1g
2) if g2 > b2 and g1 < b1 then a separating equilibrium exists if and only
if
b1
g1
+
b2
g2
 2 (19)
Furthermore if a separating equilibrium exists then
f1b  f1g
Proposition 2 implies that rms which have better performance in the
rst period and weaker performance in the second period will o¤er a lower
fraction of short-term bonuses to the Worker. Consider the interpretation
of conditions (18) and (19). Two ideas underline the analysis below. First,
when the di¤erence between rmstotal values is large enough a separating
equilibrium does not exist. This is because the type with a low total value will
mimic the high value type. A large di¤erence in the rmsrates of earnings
growth contributes to the existence of a separating equilibrium by making it
possible for g to design debt claims which will not be mimicked by b. To see
this let us rewrite (19) as follows:
vbvg(rb   rg)
vg(1 + rb)  vb(1 + rg)  2c (20)
vb(rg + rb)(1 + rg)
vgrg(1 + rb)
 2 (21)
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where rx = x2=x1 is the rate of earnings growth for type x. The condition
rx > 1means that a rm has an increasing earnings prole, rx < 1 and rx = 1
means that the rm has a decreasing or at earnings prole respectively.
Corollary 1. A separating equilibrium exists if and only if the following
holds: 1) the extent of asymmetric information regarding rmstotal values
is su¢ ciently small and; 2) the extent of asymmetric information regarding
rmsperformance proles over time is su¢ ciently large.
Figure 1 illustrates Corollary 1. Here rg = 1:5; vg = 1:6; g1 = 0:64; g2 =
0:96 and c = 0:4. The gure shows the values of rb and vb for which separating
equilibriums may exist. In the space between the thick lines (F2) a separating
equilibrium does not exist. In F1 and F3 a separating equilibrium exists.
Note that for any value of vb a separating equilibrium exists if rb di¤ers
su¢ ciently from rg and for any rb a separating equilibrium exists if vb is
high enough (close to vg). In other words, a separating equilibrium exists
if asymmetric information about rate of earnings growth is more important
than that concerning the rmstotal values.
-
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1 1:6
1:5
vb
5
rb
F1
F2
F3
(vg; rg)
Figure 1. Separating equilibria.
4 Pooling equilibria.
Let us turn to the analysis of pooling equilibria where both types play the
same strategies in both periods: f1; f; f2.8 The relations describing the par-
tiesdecisions and payo¤s are:
8Note that a separation in the second period cannot exist after pooling in the rst.
Indeed, suppose the opposite is true and in the second period one type o¤ers a lower
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1) the second-period incentive constraint for the Worker:
c  (fn + f2)(2g2 + (1  2)b2) (22)
where 2 is the Workers belief at the beginning of period 2 that the type is
g. According to Bayes rule:
2 =
g1
g1 + (1  )b1 if r1 = 1
2 =
(1  g1)
(1  g1) + (1  )(1  b1) if r1 = 0
2) the rms market value at the end of the rst period equals V1 =
2g2+(1 2)b2 if the capital market believes that the Worker will supply
e2 = 1 (i.e. condition (22) holds) and zero otherwise.
3) the Workers decision to sell shares:
fn = argmax[(f   fn)V1 +maxf0; (fn + f2)(2g2 + (1  2)b2   cg] (23)
where (f fn)V1 represents the value of shares sold andmaxf0; (fn+f2)(2g2+
(1  2)b2   cg is the Workers expected second-period payo¤.
4) the rst-period incentive constraint for the Worker:
c  f11 + E[(f   fn)V1 +maxf0; (fn + f2)(2g2 + (1  2)b2   cg] (24)
5) the payo¤ to the Employer of type x is
V = (1  f1)x1 + (1  f2   f)x2 (25)
Lemma 2. If a pooling equilibrium exists then
c = f1 b1 + f b2 (26)
f2  f2(r1) = c=e2(r1) (27)
where e2(r1) = 2g2 + (1  2)b2
fraction of earnings to the Worker than the other type. If this o¤er is accepted, the
other type will obviously mimic this strategy. Otherwise this strategy cannot be a part of
equilibrium given the limited liability of the Employer.
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Note that in contrast to the symmetric information case, f2 depends on
2 and r1 because the Worker updates his beliefs about the rms type after
observing rst-period earnings. From (27) and (26) the equilibrium strategy
can be completely described by only one variable. Take f1 for convenience.
Let V f1x be the expected payo¤ to the Employer of type x in the case of
a pooling equilibrium with f1. A pooling equilibrium is a situation where
both types play strategy f1, o¤-equilibrium workers beliefs about observing
an o¤-equilibrium strategy f1off are that the rm is type g with probability
off (f1off ) and
V f1x  V f1offx ; x 2 b; g (28)
We have:
V f1g = g1(1  f1 + (1  f2(1)  f)g2) + (1  g1)(1  f2(0)  f)g2 (29)
where f2(r1) is given by (27) and from (26)
f = (c  f1 b1)=b2
In a pooling equilibrium type g is underpriced. Thus, we will look for a
pooling equilibrium which minimizes the mispricing of type g. The mispricing
is the di¤erence between the Employers rst-best return g1 + g2   2c and
its equilibrium payo¤ V f1g .
Proposition 3. Pooling with f1 = cb1 minimizes mispricing if and only
if g2
b2
 g1
b1
; pooling with f1 =
maxf0;c (1 c=maxf e2(0); e2(1)g) b2gb1 minimizes mis-
pricing if and only if g2
b2
< g1
b1
.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is that if g2=b2  g1=b1 the extent
of uncertainty regarding long-term cash ows is large. In this case optimal
contracts put as much weight as possible on the rst period (from (26) the
maximal value of f1 is c=b1) to reduce the "lemon" e¤ect of asymmetric
information and vice versa.
Finally note that, if an ine¢ cient separating equilibrium exists (one where
type b has its rst-best payo¤ in equilibrium while type g is undervalued
because it o¤ers a larger annual bonus (or larger fraction of stock) than in the
symmetric information case to avoid being mimicked by b) then mispricing
is larger than in a pooling equilibrium described in Proposition 3. Proof of
this is omitted for brevity but is available upon request.
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5 Implications.
(i) The present paper argues that asymmetric information regarding the tim-
ing of a rms performance prole over time may a¤ect the structure of
earnings-based compensation contracts for employees. In particular, it ex-
plains when it motivates rms to issue stock options for employees and when
to use annual bonuses. From Proposition 1, a rms compensation policy is
irrelevant when information is symmetric. It is relevant when information is
asymmetric as implied by Propositions 2 and 3.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that stocks or stock options link an em-
ployes wealth with a rms value thus mitigating moral hazard and agency
problems. Since then numerous extensions of this theory have been devel-
oped. However, as mentioned in the introduction, the debates concerning
the degree to which the "pure" agency theory is able to explain numerous
puzzling phenomena about compensation contracts, are still open. Also note
that Yermack (1995, 1997) analyzes the determinats of top executivesop-
tions grants and concludes that agency theory does not explain observed data.
Oyer and Schae¤er (2004) do not nd any support for moral hazard expla-
nations for why rms issue options to employees. Another theory is based
on employeesrisk-aversion. It argues that options, by introducing convex-
ity into their payo¤s, can improve otherwise conservative decision-making by
employees. However, this idea has been challenged by Carpenter (2000) and
Ross (2004), who argue that options can actually increase managersaversion
to risk. Among other approaches note: inducing employees to sort, helping
rms retain employees and tax consideration. While all of them nd some
empirical support, none is considered a major idea behind the usage of stock
options in theoretical literature.
Sloan (1993) argues that earnings-based bonuses are used because share
prices contain "macroeconomic" noise. However, Easton, Harris, and Ohlson
(1992) provide strong evidence that earnings equal stock price changes over
long horizons, which means both prices and earnings are equally susceptible
to macroeconomic "noise" over the long run. Paul (1993) and Feltham and
Xie (1994) demonstrate the usefulness of earnings because they provide dis-
aggregate information about buisiness units or tasks. However, it does not
explain why aggregate earnings are widely used in compensation contracts.
Barclay, Gode and Kothari (2003) suggest that earnings better match the de-
livered performance by a manager while share prices also include expected fu-
ture performance. The authors argue that price-based compensation (stocks
15
or stock options) will lead to the overpayment of managers in the short run.
The empirical conrmation of the latter thoery has not yet been done.
(ii) The model predicts that short-term incentives will prevail if the extent
of asymmetric information in the rst period is lower than that in the second
period and vice versa. This is implied by Proposition 3. g2=b2 < g1=b1
means that the extent of uncertainty about future earnings is lower than that
in the rst period. Instead, if g2=b2 > g1=b1, stock options will prevail.
In addition to the evidence provided in the introduction, note that Hayes
and Schaefer (2000) nd that incentive plans become relatively more reliant
on insidersprivate information about rms future performance when the
precision of current accounting information decreases.
(iii) It follows from Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 that if the extent of
asymmetric information regarding rmstotal values is small enough (com-
pared to the extent of asymmetric information regarding the performance
prole over time) then a separating equilibrium may exist. This equilibrium
implies that rms which o¤er higher fractions of equity (through options)
in their compensation contracts have higher operating performance in the
short-run and lower operating performance in the long-run (as compared to
rms which o¤er fewer options). This is type b if g2 > b2 and g1 < b1 and
is type g if g2 < b2 and g1 > b1.
Empirical literature produces di¤erent evidence regarding the impact of
compensation contracts on rms future operating performance. However,
the following papers are noteworthy. Palia (1998) and Himmelfarb, Hubbard
and Palia (1998) nd a positive association between operating income and
management ownership. This is consistent with the stagnating type having
higher earnings in the rst period and issuing more options for employees
than the performance-improving type. Yermack (1997) shows that rms is-
suing stock options for employees outperform other rms shortly after the
issue while there is no signicant di¤erence in the long run. Cheng and
Farber (2006) nd that among rms which experience nancial restatement
those which decrease the portion of stock options in managerscompensa-
tion contracts perform better in the long term. It has also been observed
(Gilson and Vetsuypens, 1994) that rms in nancial distress (with a pro-
jected decrease in cash ows) o¤er a higher fraction of stock options in their
compensation structure and a lower fraction of bonus or cash-based com-
pensation. While all these papers provide some data which is similar to the
spirit of the present paper, a complete test of the results in point (iii) must
be based on identifying rms with high uncertainty regarding the timing of
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cash ows and low uncertainty regarding total cash ows. One can use the
spread in analystsvaluations of rmsshares as a proxy for the extent of
asymmetric information regarding the rmstotal values and the spread in
the forecasts of future earnings (long-term spread versus short-term spread)
as a proxy for asymmetric information about future rates of earnings growth.
Also, as mentioned above, rms manipulating earnings can be seen as ones
with a high degree of asymmetric information about the timing of earnings
since earnings management can often be seen as a redistribution of earnings
between periods rather than accounting fraud (Degeorge et al, 1999).
As an alternative explanation for why using options for employees may
lead to long-term underperformance, Gao and Shrieves (2002) argue that a
high proportion of options in compensation contracts provides an incentive
to engage in earnings manipulation by pumping earnings into periods when
their portfolios of options are large. Thus, less e¤ort will be allocated to
production activities. This argument only works if agents are not able to ra-
tionally anticipate such opportunistic behavior. In this case, managers and
employees can mislead the stock market by dressing earnings. We share the
idea that insiders can be involved in earnings management leading to asym-
metric information about the rms performance prole over time. However,
our explanation is based on completely rational agents.
Issuing more options to workers leads to an increase in equity capital.
Thus, our ndings are also consistent with the well-known phenomenon that
rms issuing equity underperform other rms in the long run and outperform
them in the short run (see, among others, Jain and Kini (1994) and Loughran
and Ritter (1997)).
6 Conclusion.
Lambert (2001) suggested that the private information of insiders may a¤ect
the structure of compensation contracts. This paper analyzes the structure
of earnings-based compensation contracts (annual bonuses versus stock op-
tions) when employers have private information about the rmsqualities
and workers are subject to moral hazard. The paper explains how asymmet-
ric information can a¤ect rmscompensation policies. The model predicts
that short-term incentives will prevail if the extent of short-term asymmetric
information is low relative to long-term asymmetric information. It is also
shown that among rms with potentially high degrees of asymmetric infor-
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mation regarding the timing of earnings (for instance, among rms involving
in earnings management) those o¤ering more stock options in compensation
packages outperform in the short-run and underperform in the long-run. A
discussion of empirical implications of these results is provided.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition1. Under symmetric information the rst-best solu-
tion can be obtained in the following manner. First, note that in equilibrium
(4) and e2 = 1 cannot hold simultaneously with c > f22. In this case,
V1 = 2 and from (6) the Workers payo¤ is (f + f2)2   c which is less
than f2. Thus, the Worker will sell their shares at the beginning of t = 2
and chose e2 = 0. Therefore, if the second-period constraint is satised in
equilibrium then c  f22. From (5) the rm is interested in minimizing f2
by making sure that (4) holds. If (4) does not hold then from (5) the rms
second-period payo¤ is 0. Therefore, f2 = c=2  fn. Together with c  f22
this implies fn = 0 and f2 = c=2. From (7) c = f11 + f2 and from (9)
V0 = E = 1 + 2   2c. End proof.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose the opposite is true and such an equilibrium
exists. Let g play the strategy f1g. It follows from (16), (17) and gt > bt
that V f1gbg = (1  f1g)b1 + (1  f2g   fg)b2 > b1 + b2   2c. End proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. First consider g2 > b2 and g1 < b1. Proof of
necessity. From (15), (16) and (17), the incentive constraint (13) for type g
holds if and only if:
f1b  A (30)
where
A =
2c(g2   b2)
b1g2   g1b2 (31)
The incentive constraint (14) for type b holds if and only if:
f1g  A (32)
This proves f1b  f1g. Now from (1) and (16) we have:
f1g  c=g1 (33)
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From (32) and (33)
c=g1  A
By (31) this can be rewritten as the condition (19).
Su¢ ciency. Suppose that (19) holds and consider a situation with f1g =
c=g1 and f1b = 0. The incentive constraint for b holds because of (19) and
the above argument. The incentive constraint for g holds noting that A > 0.
Now consider g2 < b2 and g1 > b1. Necessity. From (15), the incentive
constraint (13) for type g holds if and only if:
f1b  A (34)
The incentive constraint (14) for type b holds if and only if:
f1g  A (35)
This proves f1b  f1g. From (2) and (17) we have:
fg  1  c=g2 (36)
Now from (1), (16) and (36):
f1g  (2c  g2)=g1 (37)
From (35) and (37)
(2c  g2)=g1  A
This can be rewritten as (18).
Su¢ ciency. Suppose that (18) holds and consider a situation with f1g =
(2c   g2)=g1 if 2c > g2 and f1g = 0 if 2c  g2 and f1b = c=b1. The
incentive constraint for b holds because of (18). The incentive constraint for
g holds noting that c=b1 > A because
g1
b1
+ g2
b2
 2. End proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. Consider the case rg  rb. First we show that if a
separating equilibrium exists then rg  1. From Proposition 2, if a separating
equilibrium exists then (21) holds. Since the left side of (21) is increasing in
vg it should also be
(rg+rb)(1+rg)
rg(1+rb)
 2. This implies rg  1. Take the partial
derivatives of left of (21). We have: @(:)=@rb < 0; @(:)=@rg > 0; @(:)=@vb >
0; @(:)=@vg < 0. This implies that (21) holds if: 1) rb is su¢ ciently small
(other parameters being equal); 2) vb is su¢ ciently large; 3) rg is su¢ ciently
large and; 4) vg is su¢ ciently small. Now consider the case rb > rg. From
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Proposition 2, if a separating equilibrium exists then (20) holds. The rest
follows from analyzing the partial derivatives of left side of (20). End proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. In equilibrium (22) cannot hold simultaneously with
c > f2(2g2 + (1   2)b2). In this case V1 = 2g2 + (1   2)b2 and from
(23) the Workers payo¤ is (f +f2)(2g2+(1 2)b2)  c which is less than
f(2g2+(1 2)b2). Thus, the Worker will sell their shares at the end of t =
1 and chose e2 = 0. Therefore, if the second-period constraint is satised in
equilibrium then c  f2(2g2+(1 2)b2). Now consider f2. Both types are
better o¤with f2 being as small as possible. To achieve this they must make
sure that (22) holds. If (22) does not hold then, from (5), the rms second-
period payo¤ is 0. Therefore, f2 = c=(2g2+(1 2)b2) fn. Together with
c  f2(2g2 + (1   2)b2) this implies fn = 0 and f2  f2(r1) = c=e2(r1);
where e2(r1) = 2g2+(1 2)b2. In contrast to the symmetric information
case, f2 depends on 2 and r1. From (24) c = f1 b1 + f b2. End proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. From (29) @V
f1
g
@f1
=  g1+ b1g2b2 . Thus, if g2b2  g1b1 ,
f1 should be maximized. From (26) it is f1 = cb1 . Otherwise f1 should be
minimized. A minimal f1 corresponds to a maximal f . From (2) and (27) f 
1  c=maxfe2(0); e2(1)g. This condition, together with (1) and (26), implies
f1  maxf0;c (1 c=maxf e2(0); e2(1)g) b2gb1 . To prove that these pooling equilibria
exist and that they satisfy the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion, rst note that
since a separating equilibrium minimizes mispricing compared to pooling
we only consider the cases when (18) and (19) do not hold. Also, a strategy
where at least one incentive constraint for the Worker is not satised is always
dominated, for all types of Employers, by a strategy where both incentive
constraints hold (given limited liability). It holds, whatever the Workers
beliefs are, when they observe such a strategy out o¤ equilibrium. Thus, no
type of Employer will deviate to such a strategy. Therefore, we consider only
the o¤-equilibrium strategies for which both incentive constraints hold (for
some beliefs). For this set of strategies the o¤-equilibrium beliefs supporting
equilibrium are that when observing strategy joff the Worker believes that
the type is b. Thus, type b does not deviate from the equilibrium because
its equilibrium payo¤ exceeds its rst-best payo¤. Also, type g does not
deviate. To see this note that from (18), (19) and (29), @V f1g =@ > 0. The
o¤-equilibrium beliefs satisfy the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion because type
b has the potential to earn more than its equilibrium payo¤ if the beliefs are
that the type is g since @V f1b =@ > 0. End proof.
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